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Introduction
Urban areas in both the North and the South have always had some degree of minor
retail element present in their residential areas, either in the form of the corner
convenience store or the local spaza shop. However, since the 1960s, and primarily in
the cities of the North, there has been the conscious development of planned retail and
also business centres in suburban areas. This has come about in response to CBD
congestion, traffic problems, the desire to be accessible to consumers, increasing
affluence and new investment opportunities (Reimers and Clulow, 2003; Kaplan et al.,
2004). What has been witnessed is the ‘phenomenal growth of ever-larger suburban
shopping malls with more and more diversified selections and endlessly varied,
upscale, and niche-targeted merchandise (which) has curtailed and severely
diminished CBD retailing’ (Kaplan, et al., 2004, 143). From the 1970s, large, regional
malls started to emerge in the USA and from the 1980s they started to acquire leisure
and entertainment functions which once again often had negative effects on CBD areas
(Pacione, 2001). Recent, more diversified retail and business centres have been
describe by Hall (2001) as constituting a new phenomenon by becoming ‘edge cities’.
Despite the evident Northern bias, largely as a result of wealth differences, as Erkip
(2005) notes, shopping malls now appear to be part of a global trend. In the cities of the
South, there is evidence of decentralization and suburbanization, but it is not yet
happening on a major scale (Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 1998). The increasing
resurgence of the market mechanism/private sector in land markets of the cities of the
South since the 1980s is clearly playing a role in this trend (Devas and Rakodi, 1993).
While it does seem incongruous that in cities characterised by mass poverty that post-
modern, up-market retail and leisure complexes are emerging, this is the reality of the
commodification of urban space and services globally. In one of the most detailed
critiques of retail decentralization in the South, Marks and Bezzoli (2001) offer a
critique of the artificiality of the Century City complex in Cape Town which they see as
occupying ‘fictitious space, insulated from the troubles beyond its borders’ (Marks
and Bezzoli, 2001, 27), creating ‘a new city state within the city, a space of exclusion
and privilege’ (Marks and Bezzoli, 2001, 37). Given the mass poverty which prevails
in Cape Town, they correctly identify the existence of a ‘contradiction between public
discourses on urban integration and equitable development and the realty of hard-
nosed capitalism’ (Marks and Bezzoli, 2001, 43). Over time and with the bedding of
fixed investment, it is inevitable that ‘through the production of fixed and immobile
spatial configurations (transport systems, and so on)’ (Harvey, 2001, 327), greater
levels of apparent inequality will be impressed upon urban societies in the South.
When the era of neo-liberal regionalism descended on SouthernAfrica in the 1980s
and 1990s, a motley quilt of trading relations stretching across the region beckoned its
reinvigoration from foreign investors. Active agents of this new wave of African
‘modernization’ were South African retail multinationals. Wittingly or unwittingly,
the South African retailers followed the path of European colonial traders who
inscribed the earlier geographies of retail in the region. Unlike the little trading stores
of the earlier colonials, however, the post-Apartheid retailers brought in their wake a
more recent retail phenomenon – the shopping mall. Extending these malls to fifteen
foreign African countries, the South Africans superimposed these new centres on the
decayed urban infrastructure of older African cities. The ‘cathedrals of consumption’
(Jaumain and Crossick, 1999) had arrived in Africa, catapulting the old department
stores, the little trading shops and the larger state-owned wholesale stores into the
competitive new global world of food retailing. Sporting these new retail
conglomerations, African cities now unevenly mirrored the consumptive
environments of the ‘North’. These shopping malls enmesh the region in Ferguson’s
‘African connect’, where foreign investments connect the continent to the global
economy but do so in a ‘globe-hopping’ way, producing an extractive neo-liberalism
that fails to effectively integrate most Africans into the world of goods and services
(Ferguson, 2006, 49). The Southern African region has embraced a new kind of
regional development, namely the expansion of South African retailing. However
there have also been a variety of local responses that challenge the overwhelming
presence of SouthAfrican investors inAfrican retailing since the 1990s.
What does this new era of retailing mean for Zambians and the region more
generally? In this article we try to show that, while SouthAfrican capital’s expansion is
a powerful, regional manoeuvre that dispossesses as it accumulates; it is by no means
rolling over the torpid remnants of a post-Independence battlefield. Class
contestations shape and reshape the SouthAfrican economic expansion in retail. Local
entrepreneurs, investors, workers and farmers resist the imperial impetus in South
Africa’s post-Apartheid regional expansion. Workers, farmers, local entrepreneurs
and even local investors, in the form of minority share-holders, have contested the
South African-led retail expansion. Regional and continental contestations around
retail and other expansions abound, ranging from Nigerian local farmers who want to
burn down Shoprite stores, to Egyptian retailers who eschew a company that will not
play Arabic prayers during Friday prayer time, to the Shoprite workers who claimed
equal status with their SouthAfrican counterparts (Miller, 2005).
While the retail and shopping mall expansion helps to create an overwhelming
South African presence on the continent, we suggest that the region is not South
Africa’s to claim. Following on earlier work on Zambia (Miller, ibid; 2006; 2008), we
explore the historical geographies of South African retailing, arguing that the post-
apartheid region needs to be understood as a contested social space. What the region is
and how accumulation proceeds, is shaped and made by these multiple class
contestations. The second section in this paper examines the themes of race, region and
multinationalism. The third section provides a brief account of trading patterns in
colonial and post-colonial Africa, while the fourth examines the development of the
city of Lusaka. The fifth section is an empirical overview of the new shopping mall
expansion in Zambia. Two cases of local contestation and resistance (the Brait buy-out
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and the Luangeni Partnership) by both Zambians and SouthAfricans draw on accounts
of people who have engaged or stopped the SouthAfricans in their expansionary tracks
are examined in the final section of the paper.
We conclude that the narrative of ‘South Africa in Africa’ is a flawed one: the
region’s geographies speak of a region integrated since colonial times; of people who,
for a long time, traversed the region with labour and goods even when Independence
initiatives marked off regional political territories in the SADCC. New traders follow
old traders. South Africa and Africa have interdependent historical geographies that
shaped the region then and now. Post-Apartheid Southern Africa demonstrates new
forms of regional class struggle that happen beneath the surface of FTAs and regional
development initiatives such as SADC and SDIs (spatial development initiatives; for
example, Roodt in this issue). Delineating the contours of post-Apartheid regionalism
requires, indeed demands, an interrogation of these political-economic processes and
the social relations that occur at the regional level. Such regional analyses, however,
need to be informed by an understanding of how various social classes at the national
level reshape regional relations. The story revolves around ‘South Africa and Africa’;
but the post-Apartheid conceptual framework needs to be revised in favour of a more
historically accurate, relational understanding of our region.
Post-Apartheid regionalism in Southern Africa has actively promoted investment by
foreign multinationals. This active embrace of foreign direct investment has also
helped to promote foreign retailers as African governments shifted away from state-
owned industries. Regionalism and regional integration have been seen as state-driven
policies (Lee, 1989; Davies, 1991; Gibb, 1997).
In an earlier article (Miller, 2004), Miller suggested that a society-centred approach
to regionalism was necessary to break out of the overwhelming state-centrism in
regional analyses of Southern Africa. She (Miller, 2004) pointed to Niemann’s
(2001:67-72) revision of International Relations theory in which he provides a
historical account of the production of spaces in Southern Africa since the 1800s and
shows how a perception of the region as a coherent entity emerged through particular
spatial practices. Out of a physical landmass at the southern tip of the African
continent, a notion of a coherent geographic entity, a social space, emerges over time
that is intimately tied into the contests for economic control. Race formed one crucial
demarcation in representation spaces of the region, with a corresponding set of
segregated spaces of representation.
The bounded national entities that dominate the regional space are contradicted by the
spatial flows of commodities, people and labour that create mutual dependency
amongst the different societies within South Africa. There is a porosity in the borders
of the region’s countries that overflows the boundaries of nation-states and creates a
Race, region and multinational expansion
Spaces were identified by the skin colour of those who were permitted to live through
them. It was possible to read if the body of an individual was in the proper space and the
pass laws of South Africa, the housing of labour in hostels and compounds adjacent to
mines and, later, manufacturing facilities all reflected this racialization of space in
southernAfrica (Niemann, 2001: 74).
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societal level of interaction. In this sense, the region is also a ‘counterspace’ to inter-
state relations.
We can therefore imagine regions not only as spatial constructs which facilitate the
exploitation of the subcontinent; we can also imagine them as counter-spaces, as sites
of resistance to such processes. One such imagination is to think of ‘regions as spaces
of rights’ rather than spaces of flows or spaces of places. A region so conceptualized
constitutes an integrated space not because of trade flows or institutional apparatuses
but because its inhabitants share a commitment to struggle for the same enforceable
protections against abuses be they committed by states or corporations. To conceive of
regions as spaces of rights represents a direct challenge to the hegemonic consensus of
liberalism. Such efforts transcend the traditional spatial organization by insisting that
rights of persons be recognized outside and independent of the national state. They
reject the position of the state as the sole arbiter of the rights of ‘its’ citizens and
therefore create new spaces of reference (Niemann, 2001:75).
While Niemann’s revision represents a critical widening of the debate on
regionalism, understanding the region as a ‘space of rights’ both opens up and closes
down different possibilities for understanding regionalism. Seeing regions as ‘spaces
of rights’ ignores the spatial and scalar problems that regionalization poses for regional
identities against particularistic identities. Attachments to place and localities or sub-
regional identities can become stronger as spatial barriers crumble and local areas are
subjected to global forces in a more direct way. While global forces seem out of reach
and more difficult to control, communities attach more vociferously to local places
(Harvey, 1996). Extending the discussion of ‘rights’ to the spatial claims of different
social classes allows for a more expansive discussion of regionalism in Southern
Africa.
To expand Niemann’s (2001) discussion, we need to present the region as a ‘space
of claims’ by exploring the concepts of social scale and geometries of power. Scales
are a basic way of differentiating human activity from the local scale, such as the
household, the workplace, the city, the globe. In daily, lived experience, multiple
scales exist simultaneously: ‘... scale is a set of abstractions through which we make
sense of social processes making and remaking these material landscapes’ (Smith in
Jonas, 1994).
Geographic spaces are produced by abstractions that form these entities into a
particular scale-global, national, regional or local. Scale is also political, a way of
‘fixing power’ within institutions.
Limited by a specific geographic scale or level of accumulation such as the nation-
state, a rescaling process ensues at the local, sub-national, multilateral regional or
global scale, for example. Spatial representations and material practices exist in a
dialectical relationship (Smith, 1990; Lefebvre, 1996; Harvey, 1996).
Scale distils emancipatory and oppressive possibilities of space and provides a distilled
expression of spatial ideologies, racism, xenophobia ... The representation of scale lies
at the centre of spatialised politics (Smith, 1990:173).
The social relations of capitalism invariably take on a geographical expression ... What
is often less clear is the precise way in which spatial form is related to social forces
(Wolch, 1989: 5).
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In the same way that globalisation is a ‘societal construct’ (Keet, 1999), regionalism
and the formation of regions is a social process, entailing institutional power, a shared
geographic identity, regional labour markets, and is always relentlessly driven by
capitalist accumulation and framed by the power and command of money. Who is to be
integrated, how and on what basis is not simply a question of contractual regional
arrangements but a question of the spatial ‘geometries of power’ (Massey, 1992).
Shifting power geometries and their spatial representations are underpinned by the
spaces of production and reproduction. Capital’s constant re-territorialisation and
expansion is driven by over-accumulation (Harvey, 1999), and these internal
contradictions have geographic consequences.
Regionalism invokes a claim over a bounded geographic space that is also a social
space.
Bounding the region as a group of historically and economically tied countries that
should act together for a particular economic strategy produces a spatially determined
power structure that demarcates the region. As social power relations reconfigure,
these changes and produce new meanings about a specific geographic scale,
marginalizing some while thrusting others into centre stage.
What is significant here is not that inclusion and exclusion processes happen, but that
these processes take spatial forms, and have spatial consequences. A new meaning is
given to a particular social scale – the nation, the region, the global system – in line with
shifts in power relations. Regions, then, are more than physical demarcations. They
entail a social claim to a geographic space between the scale of the nation-state and the
global system. Against the Euclidian notion of ‘space-as-container’ or space as fixed,
regions are dynamic entities, not just static groups of contiguous states. Social space
according to Lefebvre’s conceptual ‘triad’ is constituted by ‘the perceived, the
conceived, and the lived’ (Lefebvre, 1991:39). The foreign investment of South
African companies in post-Apartheid Southern African can be understood as a claim
on the region. Capital’s ability to command power over space and social relations is a
central dimension in the way that the region is integrated, how regional power is
accumulated and which regional forces are marginalized. Geographic claims have
important consequences for the way that the regional role of South African
multinationals plays out.
South African-based or South African multinational corporations have played a
central role in constituting South African as a regional entity. Much of this capital
flowed through or from South Africa, allowing part of the regional surplus to fuel
SouthAfrican growth as well as enhancing the role of its multinational corporations as
an important characteristic of post-Apartheid SouthernAfrica.
South African (or South African-based) capital historically, through the agency of
the multinational firm, has integrated the countries of South Africa in an uneven way.
SouthAfrica’s ability to command capital and labour flows in the region through these
powerful multinational corporations accelerated South Africa’s economic growth,
creating tremendous regional unevenness. South African capital has established a
Most importantly, however, these scale redefinitions alter and express changes in the
geometry of social power by strengthening the power and control of some while
disempowering others (Swyngedouw, in Cox, 1997:142).
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strong claim to the regional space of Southern Africa, both in the present and in the
past. The historical geography of capital accumulation in Southern Africa has placed
South African capital, through its multinational corporations, at the centre of these
accumulation processes. Currently comprising 14 countries that are members of
SADC (the Southern African Development Community), Southern Africa is
dominated by South Africa, the region’s economic giant (Martin and O’Meara, 1995;
Seidman and Makgetla, 1980). Capital accumulation develops the most profitable
sectors of the economy to the detriment of other sectors, creating uneven capital flows.
South Africa is a region of unevenness in regional flows of capital accumulation,
generating $130bn of the region’s $160bn in output in 1998.
Global accumulation processes centred on South Africa have shaped the
boundaries of the region.
The notion of SouthernAfrica as a coherent geopolitical entity can be traced back to the
first ‘Scramble for Africa’. As cycles of world hegemony have evolved, Africa has
been the site of renewed scrambles and reterritorialization of capital. South Africa’s
regional domination goes back to the phases of early mining and finance accumulation
under colonial expansion. The initial expansion that centred on South Africa,
Zimbabwe and Zambia occupied a central place within this new formation. Combining
with this territorial expansion were also the imperialist expansion of the capitalist type
(Harvey, 2003: 33-36), entailing large investments in rail and road networks. This
phase of Southern African accumulation coincided with the period of the Great
Depression, initiating a new phase of capital’s reterritorialization in Africa (Vieira,
Wallerstein and Martin, 1992).
The period from 1873-1920 saw the British, the global hegemon of the time,
consolidate political control over the areas of mineral wealth in Southern Africa and
form political boundaries that endure today. Gold mining in Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe) and Johannesburg’s Reef (South Africa), copper mining in Northern
Rhodesia (Zambia), and Kimberley’s diamond mining absorbed capital surpluses
from London financial and commercial and corporation and commodity surpluses of
British manufactures. Despite this regional economic integration through London and
South African-based capital, political divisions inscribed regional fault-lines. White
settler regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique were isolated
internationally in the period during the two World Wars and after the World War II,
bequeathing to the region a racially divided historical geography.
Ideas of developing intra-African export markets and ‘delinking’ from the
dominant ‘North’ animated post-colonial Africanist programmes. The NIEO (New
International Economic Order) perspective inspired many Africanist programmes in
the 1960s and 1970s. ‘Collective self-reliance’ was a strong principle in the
programmatic perspectives for Africa at the time. One example was the Lagos Plan of
Action, adopted by the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU) in 1980 and proposed by
the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Throughout this period of national
self-determination in some parts of Southern Africa, however, multinationals
continued to use Apartheid South Africa as a base of their investment activities in
If we are to understand how the social construct ‘Southern Africa’ came into existence,
we must place it in the context of the cyclical rhythms of capitalist world-economy
(Vieira, Wallerstein and Martin, 1992: 5).
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SouthernAfrica. Some of the capital surpluses that flowed through SouthAfrica during
this period were trapped in SouthAfrica, partly through the protectionist policies of the
Apartheid sate, allowing SouthAfrica’s economy to expand faster than other countries
in the region.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a new scramble in Africa, this time led by
the trans-national corporations who sought new sites of investments for over-
accumulated capital. As countries became politically independent, South Africa was a
stable launching-pad for investment into the region (Seidman, 1980:45). Protected by
Apartheid, global multinationals formed joint ventures with South Africa companies.
In the 1960s, eight of South Africa’s top eighteen industrial companies had major ties
with transnational firms. (Seidman, 1980). Regional economic integration proceeded
despite the political barriers. While political geometries demarcated the region into
white settler states, on the one hand, and Frontline (independent) black states on the
other, the territorial independence of African nation-states after national liberation
struggles interrupted but did not halt continued capitalist expansion. Nationalization
operated unevenly in economies that allowed multinational investment often via and
from South Africa. These racialised patterns of regional development were replicated
over time in the retail sector, as discussed below.
One common element in the development of retailing inAfrica was the colonial pattern
of indigenous exclusion. During this period, credit extended more from the metropole
to the European entrepreneur than to any other community. Combined with racial
municipal legislation, white-run businesses dominated the formal retail market in
many African cities. As settler cities grew in the 1930s and 1940s, central business
districts (CBDs) expanded. African businessmen, however, were prohibited by
municipal legislation from retail activities in the towns. African townships were
typically served with cheap imitations of ‘white stores’ and confined to the ‘truck
trade’ (Burke, 1995: 100).
Like other less-developed regions, retailing in Southern Africa is extremely
diversified, ranging from informal street traders to small outlets with low turnover, to
larger shopping complexes (Findlay et al., 1990). Limited purchasing power, low
outreach and poor infrastructure are some of the common factors that have restricted
the growth of retailing in poorer countries (Paddison in Findlay et al., 1990). In the
twentieth century, retail infrastructure clustered in some places and failed to penetrate
others, the urban-rural divide being the most graphic illustration of this uneven
clustering of money and resources.
Race politics in retailing was not only along white-black fault lines. There was a lot
of anti-semitism amongst the company officials from the controlling British Company
of South Africa (BCSA). Racial politics manifested itself between Jewish traders and
Chartered Company officials in these early days already. The district commissioner for
Lealui in 1901 went on a tirade against the Jewish traders, calling them of ‘undesirable
character’ (Findlay et al., 1990, 27). He charged that the Jewish traders were successful
because they were willing to include ammunition in their deals with local. The dispute
between European traders also caused a loss of prestige for whites, in the view of the
commissioners.
Trading in colonial and post-colonialAfrica
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There is I regret to say a certain insolence about the natives towards traders, other than
Jews, making it difficult to maintain the peace and the respect for the white man is not
what it should be (Findlay et al., 1990, 28).
Traders kept close relations with ruling group in order to keep their trading lines open.
Competition amongst small traders with limited capital resources was vicious.
‘Legitimate’ traders were seen by a larger retailers like Susman – the founders of which
came from the Baltic region – as those who operated from substantial stores and built
large camps, unlike the small traders who traded from their wagons and operated with
lower cost and profits. These small traders regularly undercut prices and moved their
wagons to the nearest markets. ‘Hard work, good credit, efficient trading and a
superior understanding of the market’ helped the Susman become the dominant traders
in the area, argues Macmillan (ibid: 48). This was aided by the liberalization of trading
licences by the colonial government which recognized their important commercial
role.
King Lewanika summed up the racial politics of the time in the following way:
From 1910 the Susman brothers expanded outwards into Livingstone. The Susman
used the cold storage facilities of the North-Western Rhodesia Cold Storage plants set
up by the railways contracts, then under the Chartered Company. After the war,
Werners was the main Copperbelt business of the Susman Brothers & the Wulfsohn
Group. There was constant diversification in the Susman’s activities into the post-war
years which included transport, timber, saw mills, textiles and expanding cattle sales as
South African demand grew. This provided the basis for the Gersh and Susman
brothers. In keeping with colonial practices, wages for their African workers were low
and working conditions were poor. While the Susman brothers colonized the area north
of the Zambezi, Apartheid-South Africa developed its own racial geographies. The
lucrative central business districts were reserved for European and white South
African companies like Stuttafords, Greatermans, John Orr’s and OK Bazaars. White
consumers were the target shoppers in these towns.
As the cities grew, local white and foreign (mainly European) investors built shops,
shopping centres and infrastructure in white suburbs and CBDs with government
support. A host of racial municipal by-laws restricted the growth of African
entrepreneurs and the retail sector in black residential areas. Local black consumers
had to rely on informal trading markets and visits to white CBDs for their
requirements. The poverty of black township residents and the lack of infrastructure
development made these areas less attractive to retail property developers. Retail
accumulation in the black townships and locations of Southern Africa was therefore
stunted, with the growing underdevelopment of these areas restricting their market
capacity. The geography of retail accumulation during the colonial phase became
racially segregated in most parts of Southern Africa, favouring local white and
Europeans investors (Colclough, 1989; Findlay et al., 1990).
There are three types of whites: those of the government, traders and missionaries. Those of the
government, fear them, they have the power; traders, eat them, for they have come to eat you.As for
the missionaries they are ours, they are at home with us – chez nous (King Lewanika, 1898, p.52).
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Planning the segregated city: Lusaka 1929-2002
As with cities throughout the South, Lusaka, now the capital of Zambia, is a place of
wealth contrasting with extreme poverty and deprivation. The harsh economic
conditions which have prevailed since the 1970s in Zambia saw the city’s
unemployment rising from 13.7 to 26 percent during the 1990-2002 period. In 1998, 52
percent of Lusaka’s population was rated as poor and 34 percent as extremely poor
(Central Statistics Office, 2003). Lusaka, started from humble beginnings as a minor
railway siding in 1905 and in 1913 was accorded Village Management Status. In 1931,
Lusaka was selected as a new potential capital based on its altitude, underground water
supply and transport accessibility and in 1935 became the capital. The initial plan
provided for a city of only 13,000, primarily European people and was subsequently
noted for its under-provision of land for African people (Williams, 1986). With its
current population estimated at over 1,7 million (IDP, 2002), the contrast between the
planned mini-capital designed for colonial officials and the reality of what is now a
vast and often poorly planned metropolis, could not be more stark.
By the late 1940s, many of the oversights of the 1930s plan were becoming evident.
These included the lack of provision for low density ‘sprawl’ and its associated costs, a
failure to adequately accommodate theAfrican population and the faster than expected
economic and employment growth which had been experienced (Mulenga, 2006). As
an initial response to the housing shortage for both dominant race groups, new
European suburbs were laid out along the Great East Road and African housing was
provided to the north of the city, with the Matero area following in 1951 (van den Berg,
1984). Despite being only 14 years before independence, it is remarkable the degree to
which racial bias, prejudice and alien planning notions persisted and further shaped the
pre-independence city form. The plan was based on the following principles:
The ‘associated and parallel development of Europeans and natives’ (Jellicoe,
1950, 6).
To cater for ‘a car-owning European population and an African population that
would be walking’ (Jellicoe, 1950, 6).
The ‘need to create for the European landscape as stimulating and vivid as that of
his native land and to retain for the native something of his own background of sky
and forest’ (Jellicoe, 1950, 9).
In terms of applied planning, the central focus on the government reserve at Ridgeway,
and the planned Cathedral in particular was reinforced with the area being seen as
‘distinguished and somewhat classical in character’ (Jellicoe, 1950, 12). The urban
boundary was delineated, separate residential areas were laid out and provided the
basis for the now important eastern settlements areas, the current the road layout and
associated traffic roundabouts (Williams, 1986). In 1951 the new development plan
was adopted as a ‘Statutory Development Plan’ (as adapted in 1985), and with its
inherent planning of a racially/socially separate city, it remained the basis for planning
till 1978, well into the post-independence period. The focus on up-market
developments to the east, since World War II and along the Great East Road transport
corridor in particular laid the basis for what in the twenty-first century has become the
zone of investment, privilege and social distancing, centred in recent years, on the new
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major, segregated African housing developments at Chilenga, Matero and Kamwala
(Williams, 1986), while ‘European areas continued to be laid out as “garden suburbs”
at low densities, based on the reliance on the private car for transport, to accommodate
... a settler population’ (Rakodi, 1986, 208).
With racial segregation, this produced the basic urban form of Lusaka. Independence
came in 1964, and as far as the city was concerned, the legacy of garden city planning,
racial (now class) bias and the provision of a city in which wealth was concentrated in
the centre and east were perpetuated, as previous urban planning legacies went
unchallenged.
On a positive note, independence brought about a ‘new lease of life’ for the city
with the construction of embassies, the university, airport and national assembly –
however all of these were constructed to the east of the city, with all major
developments being in the proximity of the Great East Road. In parallel with these
changes, the population rose from 107,000 to 246,000 between 1963 and 1969
(Mulenga, 2006). Rapid housing development followed, both in terms of serviced sites
and informal settlements – but there were no corresponding changes in the town
planning schemes (William, 1986), leading to rapid peri-urban development, such that
by the late 1970s, 80 percent of population were living in informal settlements
(Rakodi, 1986; Mulenga, 2006).
In 2002 the Lusaka City Council commissioned an Integrated Development Plan
(Lusaka City Council, 2002; Mukwato, pers comm., 2007). The plan was drafted by
South African consultants called v3 Consulting Engineers, once again perpetuating
foreign bias and dependence. At the time of writing, the plan had not been sanctioned,
apparently because of problems of cost and restricted land access. The plan introduces
what have become accepted principles in South African planning such as Local
Economic Development and informal sector support. However, its support for nodal
development and development corridors to concentrate development in a linear
fashion along transport corridors (IDP, 2002) will reinforce class-based differences
and decentralization to elite nodal areas, if it is applied. When shopping mall
development therefore came to Lusaka, it was in a development pattern that reinforced
past geographies of race and class.As Van den Berg observes:
The new SouthAfrican retail sector expanded as the regional hub grew, confronting the
limits of Apartheid accumulation when excess cash for investment dammed up in the
1980s. This section traces this growth in the South African retail sector, showing that
Zambian liberalization coincided with the liberation of South African capital from its
Apartheid constraints with the elections of 1994.
The legacy of the Adshead and Bowling plans remains the government and residential
development along the ridge, scattered low density residential development to the north
and high density residential development to the South (Rakodi, 1986, 207).
The town planning efforts of Lusaka have all along contributed to its racial segregation
and excessive sprawl, by separating the old town from the new town, by usurping the
space at the ridge and other attractive areas for urban growth and by ignoring space
requirements for mostAfrican town dwellers (van den Berg, 1984, 18).
SouthAfrican retail expansion in Zambia
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In the mid-1960s, retailers in SouthAfrica studied the Canadian model and saw the
benefits of drawing a large number of consumers to the same place, where they became
a critical shopping mass. Their shift away from the CBD and to the suburbs was also
informed by the US model of highway development with shopping centres located at
the interchanges of these highways. The target areas of new shopping centres in South
Africa were the white suburbs. Enterprising white property developers began by
opening Darragh Centre and Hyde Park Centre, both in Johannesburg. These white
suburban shopping centres became targets for new financial accumulation by South
African finance capital in the 1970s. As the interest rates rose, South Africa’s large
MNCs such as Liberty Life, Sanlam, Old Mutual and the Eskom Pension Fund gobbled
up the small-scale developers. The (largely women) shoppers were less important to
them. What they really coveted were the blue-chip tenants and the high rentals that they
paid. Soon, the mega shopping mall replaced the smaller shopping centre.
According to G. Fritz, Shoprite-Zambia’s General Manager at the time, the
Shoprite group’s historical experience in Africa since the 1960s through their clothing
chain, Pep Stores, and their supermarkets in the black-run, nominally independent
‘homelands’ of South Africa gave them some organizational advantages. This
experience with black rural and working class consumer markets as well as their
surplus capital and bold organisational leadership in the company’s upper echelons,
positioned Shoprite to penetrate a consumer market perceived as high-risk and with
low consumer savings. Their absorption of other retailers like OK Bazaars added to
this sense of ‘African know-how’. Consolidation of the industry over the past few
years, for example, Shoprite’s acquisition of OK, has narrowed competition to three
large players in SouthAfrica: Shoprite, Pick ’n Pay and Spar (part of Tiger Foods).
Other retail multinationals faced with a similarly crowed market have employed
expansion strategies in other global regions such as Europe and Australia. Losing
market share in South Africa to large competitors like Pick ’n Pay and Spar, Shoprite –
along with other South African retailers like Game, Steers, Debonairs, Engen,
ProFurn, the J. D. Group and Wimpy – opted for a ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey 1982) to
address their crises of accumulation.As one of the largest retail multinationals in South
Africa, Shoprite made R70 million available for reinvestment in Africa in 1999
(www.shoprite.co.za).
Shoprite now has stores in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in Southern
Africa. In EastAfrica it has stores in Tanzania and Uganda, in NorthAfrica it has stores
in Egypt and in WestAfrica it has stores in Ghana and of late, Lagos, Nigeria. It has also
opened up a store in Mumbai, India, its first foreign operations beyond Africa. The
primary business of the Shoprite Group is food retailing. It claims to be the largest fast
moving consumer goods retailer. Shoprite models its cross-border investments on its
shopping centre developments in South Africa, featuring a Shoprite supermarket as an
anchor store. These shopping malls change the local consumption and urban
environments dramatically. Locally-owned internet stores and music outlets often
make up part of this cluster. In a number of cases, the Shoprite Group establishes
partnerships with a local group. For example, Egyptian Kuwait Holdings has a 30
percent share in the Egypt investment.
MALLS IN ZAMBIA 45
But for this foreign expansion to enjoy any success, it needed local markets in host
countries. Consumer markets in Zambia, like many other countries, are highly diverse.
Despite high levels of general poverty, white expatriate and black Zambian elites have
significant savings and consumptive capacity, sometimes generated by earnings in
foreign currency (dollars, rands). Such expatriates, government elites and middle class
professionals are significant customers for the new supermarkets. Some of these
internal markets have local peculiarities. For example, company management reported
that Angolan diplomats and international community workers cross the border for
olive oil, bakery items and other specialist items at the rural supermarket in Solwezi
province, a market which Shoprite management in Zambia have learnt to cater for in
this branch (Interview, General Manager, Zambia, August 2003). Trade unionists also
argued that there was pent-up demand as there had no outlet as long as the retail and
services sectors were run as poorly stocked, state-owned enterprises. People had
money, but had to go to South Africa to buy commodities that they now can find inside
Zambia at South African companies. (Interviews, NUCIW officials, Lusaka region,
August 2002). Working class consumers have made use of Shoprite’s promotional
activities to buy basic consumer items such as fish, oil, eggs, washing powder, rice,
bread and milk (although these promotions appear to be less now as the company is
more established and tax breaks for the company’s first years in both countries are
over). The expanding tourist sectors have also boosted consumption capacity in the
region.
The informal market sources some of its goods from Shoprite in Zambia, hence the
conversion of one store in Lusaka into a primarily wholesale store, catering for small
shop owners from rural areas as one of their key markets. In rural areas where Shoprite
has outlets, informal traders buy from Shoprite and resell to local consumers,
sometimes just outside of the company’s premises. In the Copperbelt province of
Zambia,Anglo-American’s pull-out in 2001 led to smaller businesses going under and
Shoprite’s capture of local market share that had previously gone to these competitors
(Telephone Interview, Zambian Regional Manager,April 2002). While it may be more
efficient in some ways if Shoprite adopted a style of wholesale stores rather than
shopping mall supermarkets, Shoprite is wedded to its brand image and the new
consumer environment that this brand creates in less developedAfrican locales outside
of SouthAfrica.
In Zambia, nationalization policies attempted to restructure the racialised
geographies of retail development. These efforts were reflected in the Africanisation
initiatives of the government which created a tier of black Zambian management who
were in charge of the state-owned wholesale stores. Larger economic difficulties
restricted these efforts at restructuring for national economy, copper prices collapsed
on the global market, dooming the prospects of the nascent nationalist experiment and
a typical African debt trap ensued. In Zambia, Anglo-American was paid full
compensation in American dollars for the state’s purchase of ZAMANGLO and with
no restrictions of profits abroad (Innes, 1984: 24). Designed to trap profits for national
development, therefore, nationalization often benefited MNCs through the large
compensation paid to these companies by newly independent states when they
expropriated the companies. A host of problems relating to nationalized systems of
ownership and control, hampered commodity production and distribution, reducing
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the retail sector to a stuttering system of tatty commodities by the time of Shoprite’s
arrival in the late 1990s (Ariyo andAfeikhena, 1999).
Reflecting the regional emphasis on FDI, Zambia’s democratic, union-led government
embarked on a vigorous programme for attracting foreign investors when they look
office in 1991. Since 2002 the country has recorded positive economic growth,
averaging five percent each year. It was in the 1990s, therefore, that major sectors of
the Zambian economy went up for sale to private investors, including the strategic
copper mines. The government privatized more than 200 state-owned enterprises in
the 1990s (Kolala, 2000:15). Like many other countries in Southern Africa, Zambia
formed a Zambian State Privatization Agency to oversee the sale of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). The Zambia PrivatizationAgency (ZPA) established in 1992 by an
Act of parliament carried out the privatization of inter alia dairy boards, parks, milling
factories, sawmill assets, hotel and wholesalers. Multinational firms from the UK,
Italy, Germany, China and India bought many SOEs and by 1997 over 200 of 326
parastatals had been sold (ZPA Privatisation Status Report, July 2002). No limitations
or conditions applied to foreign investors and their capital exports from profit (Torres,
1998: 214). Critics of the state’s liberalization attribute the subsequent contraction of
the Zambian economy to the privatisation policies. During the period of intensified
structural adjustment under Chiluba’s regime, the mining industry’s contribution to
the overall economy declined while the service sector grew.
The Zambian economy only recently emerged from a decline of three decades,
where per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased from $700 in 1970 to $390
in 1998. Since 1999 a 3.7 percent increase per year has been registered each year to
2003. Loans in Zambia are difficult to acquire for local capital with prevailing annual
interest rates of around 28 percent and collateral of three times the loan size is required.
Between 1980 and 2002, however, FDI increased from US$61.7m to US$197m.
(African Inc. Report, p.6). Other investors have also taken advantage of the new
environment.
An Investment Climate Assessment conducted in 2003 showed that areas such as
services and tourism have been important for recent new Chinese capital in the
country. There have been mixed responses to this growth in foreign investment in
Zambia. Zambia is one of a number of African countries (Angola, Botswana,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Uganda), that has no controls on outward FDI, making its economy more
vulnerable. At some level there has been an improvement in Zambia's links to global
production and distribution systems; at other levels there has been evidence of asset
stripping through foreign direct investment. FDI often displaces local capital and
undermines the growth of local suppliers (Miller, 2008).
While state ownership placed nationalized retail out of private capital
accumulation during Independence, the post-Apartheid region combined political
change in South Africa with wholesale sectors became a new phase of retail
development in Zambia and Southern Africa more generally. South African retailers
Anglo used this money to establish MINORCO in Bermuda through which it became a
major global player in mining in Latin America, Canada and the United States (Innes,
1984: 235, 236).
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were the principle investors talking advantage of retail liberalization in Zambia. South
Africa’s influence in the Zambian retail sector has grown significantly. SouthAfrica is
now the largest foreign investor, dominating 39 percent of the retail market (Zambia
Investment Centre).
As part of Zambia’s privatization, the national state wholesale stores were sold off
in a deal with SA’s Shoprite Holdings in 1999. Now, in an era of slow economic
growth, global connections are being re-established, but such connections are based on
wealth and privilege. As we illustrate below, creating zones of exclusivity in Lusaka is
an expression of inequality, social distancing and privilege which is expressed
spatially through the investment choices of local and international capital investment.
From the preceding discussion it is clear that, at an economic level, there has been a
fundamental socio-economic transition over the last 40 years in Zambia and in Lusaka
more specifically. This has been from an era of imposed colonial/British town
planning, investment and control, through a period of economic disconnection
(Ferguson, 1999) to the present era of post- and neo-colonialism. The present is
marked by increasing South African investment or at least the presence of their
differing degrees of ‘connectedness’ to global capitalism, a gradually exploration of
South African urban planning policies and an evolving urban form which, in the
wealthier areas, is starting to mirror the retail decentralization of western and South
cities, with the associated reinforcement of a zone of privilege. While the cause of this
shift cannot be levelled solely against South African capital interest, as local
entrepreneurs are in fact often key drivers in the process, the former none the less either
directly through investment, or indirectly through franchising opportunities are
influencing both investment and upmarket retail behaviour in Lusaka.
Since 2000, retail (and to some degree leisure) opportunities have been radically
transformed for Lusaka’s upper income residents with the building of three new, large,
out-of town retail centres. The three centres are Manda Hill [1] opened in 1999,
Arcades [2] opened in 2003 and Crossroad [3] opened in 2006 (Interviews: Banage,
2007; Ferrier, 2007; Mubita, 2007). In addition, the city’s first major decentralized
business park was under construction at the time of writing. All four of these
development are located in the wealthier eastern section of the city, three of which lie
on the key Great East Road transport corridor. The third, Crossroads [3] lies on a
secondary transport corridor.
There are significant variations in the ownership profile of the three centres which
reflect differing local histories and control. Manda Hill was initially established by
Manda Hill Centre Limited, a property development agency with three local directors
and one South African (Patents and Companies Registration Office, 1999). The
complex was 20 percent owned by Zambia Venture Capital and 80 percent by
Commonwealth Africa Investment. In 2005 Manda Hill Centre Limited were bought
out by a South African (Manda Hill is currently owned by HBW Group consortium,
Knight Frank Property Developers (Interview, Banage, 2007). The centre itself has
South African and Zambian directors. Arcades was established by Arcades PLC
formed by a group of local Zambian businessman. Crossroads is owned by Ganesh
Properties which is under the sole ownership of a single Zambian businessman. Capital
Malls in Zambia and challenges to SouthAfrican expansion
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may have been raised internationally but this has not been verified (Interviews, Ferrier,
2007; Interview, Mubita, 2007).
Only Manda Hill is SouthAfrican owned – and then only since 2005, after six years
of joint ownership with Zambian investors (Interview, Banage, 2007). Arcades,
Crossroads and the new business park are Zambian-owned. The Zambian-led mall
expansion also extends beyond the capital of Lusaka. Arcades PLC (Platinum Gold
group) has just opened a shopping centre in Livingstone and is planning a major
development in Kitwe on the Copperbelt (Interview, Mubita, 2007). The Shoprite
supermarket in the Manda Hill complex is the largest of Shoprite’s 18 outlets in
Zambia and also houses Shoprite’s Zambian headquarters. Spar is another key South
African supermarket chain in Arcades which has provided competition to Shoprite
since their arrival (Interview, Regional Manager, Shoprite, 2007).
Expansion continues at the malls, suggesting that the retail development in the city
is not static.As noted above, a luxury hotel is being built atArcades (Interview, Mubita,
2007); in April 2007 Manda Hill announced a multi-million dollar expansion plan to
upgrade existing shops, provide a covered central retail area, a cinema complex and
new parking facilities valued at US$30 million (Interview, Vassilopoulus, 2007). This
will place Manda Hill in direct competition with Arcades for leisure market activities
and will also significantly increase the size by at least 50 percent to over 30 000 sq.
metres, double the current size of Arcades and in line with some of the medium to
larger centres globally.
While at one level the development of the new shopping centres has expanded
retail choice in Lusaka and diverted activity away from the congested CBD, it is
inevitable that such centres provoke local responses, particular in the case of the local
workers employed by foreign corporates. Studies (Miller, 2005) have shown that
South African shops place South Africa and their regional multinationals at the centre
of a new post-Apartheid regional imagery. South Africa becomes a focal point for the
claims of workers and farmers who deal with the major South African retailer, namely
Shoprite. Fuelled by South Africa’s regional strength and dominance, worker and
farmers locate their claims with the regional multinational given their disillusionment
with their nation-states (Miller, 2008). If Zambian workers and farmers no longer trust
their government, they will direct their claims at the strong multinationals which
appear to be benefiting most from the country’s liberalization policies. In Chipata, a
town in the Eastern Province of Zambia, for example, local farmers accused the new
Shoprite in their town of the displacement of their local livelihoods and threatened to
burn down the store (Miller, 2008). Fears of deindustrialisation and foreign pull-outs
have seen Shoprite workers resist the company’s proposed buy-out by a private equity
fund, Brait, in 2007. This led to acrimonious exchanges and a court injunction,
including resistance from SouthAfrican minority shareholders that ultimately scuttled
the deal. These examples indicate the relations with their country. These case studies of
local resistance are discussed below.
Resistance has not only emerged from likely around predictable issues –
wage exploitation and the presence of workers at the foreign supermarkets. Two
unanticipated sites of struggle have impeded South Africa’s retail expansion,
emanating from two less likely quarters: shareholders in South Africa along with
workers in Zambia, firstly, and secondly villagers in the rural Eastern Province in
resisters
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Zambia. An attempt by South Africa retailer, Shoprite to sell off shares to a private
equity fund, Brait Ltd., was resisted and ultimately failed. In the second instance,
villagers in the rural province forced a supplier partnership on the company which did
not succeed but provided an important example of an economic partnership between
the SouthAfrican multinationals and disempowered local communities.
In April 2006 Brait, a private equity fund, placed a buy-out offer before Shoprite.
This deal involved restructuring the company and terminating its Johannesburg Stock
Exchange listing. A new private subsidiary called New Retail and Shoprite Holdings
would be liquidated. Shareholders could cash in or re-invest in New Retail. Shoprite
motivated this private equity model as a move that would improve BBBEE (Broad
Black Economic Employment) by allowing mangers and workers a bigger stake in the
company through share offers and the creation of a Shoprite workers’ trust. Brait had
raised R6.1bn from local and overseas investors which it needed to spend within the
ensuing five years (Interview, J. Gnodde, Brait Executive Director). After its initial
offer was rejected by shareholders, Brait raised its offer by 7.7 percent from R13.2bn to
R14.2billion and again to R15bn. Shareholders were dissatisfied with the way the bid
was structured. In terms of the proposed buy-out, Brait would have become a majority
shareholder in Shoprite. Coronation, as one of the larger shareholders, also challenged
the deal. Ultimately, the deal fell through as the price that shareholders demanded was
higher than Brait was willing to pay.
Like the Shoprite shareholders, Shoprite workers in Zambia were also not happy
with the deal. They filed an interim court injunction against Shoprite (which trades as
Africa Supermarkets in Zambia). There were 771 workers involved in the injunction
led by an individual called Vasco Mainza. They wanted an assurance that the
company’s assets and bank accounts could not be moved abroad until their terminal
benefits had been settled.
They charged that the workers had R5 billion with the company and, in the light of
the proposed buy-out, they wanted reassurance that their benefits would not be
negatively affected. The Zambian manager of Shoprite, Stefan Krantz, argued that the
company was not in the process of going into a voluntary liquidation. The proposal
from Brait came through Maxwell 107 Investments. Krantz argued that the proposal
that Shoprite Holdings change to New Retail would not affect the subsidiaries in any
way. While top ownership structures might be affected, this would not extend to the
subsidiaries. The Zambian operation would therefore not be affected in any way by the
restructuring at the apex of the group. If there was any impact on workers’ conditions,
provision had been made in the company’s accounts for this eventuality. The court
injunction was granted on 27 December 2006. Both parties agreed that the injunction
should be discharged after negotiations. In terms of the negotiation, Shoprite agreed to
open a Citibank account with ESCROW in which they would deposited Kwacha
5,012,649,980.
In the case of the villagers from Chipata in the Eastern Province, University of
Zambian students conducting research in the village of Luangeni, Chipata, had learnt
that villagers were threatening to burn down the local Shoprite store. These local
farmers claimed that their regular sales at the village market had been undermined by
the presence of the new Shoprite supermarket. They needed cash for privatized
services such as education and health care, and the village market was an important
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source of such cash income for their vegetable crops. Shoprite dispatched their
mangers to liaise with Luangeni farmers.
Partnership structures were set up which included non-governmental organizations
operating in the area as well as the local Agricultural Extension Officer and
representatives of the company and the farmers. Some donors stepped in and provided
seed funding for the newly-formed Luangeni Cooperative Community Project
(LCCP). A corresponding structure called the Luangeni Partnership Forum (LPF) was
formed in Lusaka. This structure has five directors and a officer that liased with the
local supplier structures. The LPF was meant to function as a liaison between the
village co-op and the company. Other similar initiatives were launched in the Chamba
Valley region. The villagers agreed to supply the company with five vegetables –
lettuce, tomatoes, green beans, onions, cabbages. Shoprite structured its supplier
relationship with the villagers around a ‘green market’ that operated on a Saturday in a
specially assigned venue adjacent to the Shoprite store. With the help of the donors,
support was given to local farmers in the form of advice on farming method and the
provision of seeds and fertilizers. Although improvement occurred, there were still
several hurdles to overcome.
This paper has illustrated a number of key themes. These include the intersection of
race, space and retail in the evolving manifestation and operation of retailing in
SouthernAfrica over the last 100 years. In the case of Lusaka, Zambia, retail growth in
recent years has been led by South African multi-nationals, who have grafted their
spatial and retail planning on to the historically segregated profile of the city,
reinforcing class division in the post-independence era. South African growth has not
gone uncontested as the case studies quoted above show. In addition, it is particularly
noteworthy that retail growth in Lusaka is not solely a South African led phenomenon
but rather it is an area in which local capital interests are taking an active part. Retailing
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